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Hereunder, we study the class of irreducible private states that are private states from which all
the secret content is accessible via measuring their key part. We provide the first protocol which
distills key not only from the key part, but also from the shield if only the state is reducible. We
prove also a tighter upper bound on the performance of that protocol, given in terms of regularized
relative entropy of entanglement instead of relative entropy of entanglement previously known. This
implies in particular that the irreducible private states are all strictly irreducible if and only if the
entangled but key-undistillable states (”entangled key-undistilable states”) exist. In turn, all the
irreducible private states of the dimension 4 ⊗ 4 are strictly irreducible, that is, after an attack on
the key part they become separable. Provided the bound key states exist, we consider different
subclasses of the irreducible private states and their properties. Finally we provide a lower bound
on the trace norm distance between key-undistillable states and private states, in sufficiently high
dimensions.
Obtaining the classical secret key for data encryption
via quantum states is one of the main contributions of
quantum information theory towards security in the era
of information [1]. This goal has been achieved using
the celebrated maximally entangled state [2–4]. However,
the quantum states which have a property that after the
measurement one can get at least m bits of a secret se-
cure key (against quantum eavesdropper) form a much
broader class of states called private states [5]. The max-
imally entangled state is an example of a private state. In
general, a private state has two subsystems: the key part
(AB) and the shield (A′B′). From the key part one can
obtain the secure key via von Neumann measurements
on its local subsystems, while the shield is protecting the
key part from the Eavesdropper who holds the purify-
ing system of the total state. More precisely, any private
state with at least m bits of key has the form
γABA′B′ =
1
d
∑
ij
|ii〉〈jj|AB ⊗ UiσA′B′U†j , (1)
where σA′B′ ≡ σ is an arbitrary state on A′B′ and Ui are
unitary transformations.
Private states have been used to formalize quantitative
relation between secrecy and entanglement. Namely, it
has been shown that the classical secure key, is in, fact
an entanglement measure denoted as KD [5, 6]. This led
to upper bounds on the secure content of quantum states
via relative entropy of entanglement [5–7] and squashed
entanglement [8–11] and further generalizations for quan-
tum channels via squashed entanglement of a quantum
channel [12, 13] and relative entropy of entanglement
extended to quantum channel [14] (see also [15–18] in
this context). Recently, there has been shown a re-
lated impossibility result that one cannot achieve non-
negligible amount of key [19] in the framework of quan-
tum repeaters [20] using some certain approximate pri-
vate states (a problem of quantum key-repeaters).
In general the importance of the class of private states
follows from the fact that any quantum key distribution
protocol (including the so-called quantum device inde-
pendent ones [21, 22]) is equivalent to a protocol whose
output is a private state. Hence, in a coherent view on
quantum mechanics, the output of any quantum key dis-
tribution protocol P has form of the state (close to) the
one given in equation (1). Having γABA′B′ as the output
of P. The part AB, measured in computational basis,
yields outcomes which are directly used for one-time-pad
encryption.
By definition a private state has then directly accessi-
ble key in the key part while the shield system A′B′ has
been considered as a passive resource merely assuring se-
curity of the key part. Intuitively, however one might
consider distillation of key from also from the shield sys-
tem. The caveat though is that the latter distillation
should not leak information about the key resting in the
key part. The private states which have the property,
that their whole secure content is accessible via measur-
ing their key part in computational basis, i.e. for which
KD(γdk) = log dk, where dk is the local dimension of A
and B, are called irreducible. All other private states are
called reducible.
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2The aim of this manuscript is then twofold: first, to
characterize irreducible private states, and study their
properties, the second, more importantly, to provide the
protocol which distills key from not irreducible (i.e. re-
ducible) private states at higher rate than the trivial
one, equal to log dk. We then naturally encounter a
hard problem of whether there exist entangled, but key-
undistillable states, which appears to be tightly con-
nected to the problem of characterization of irreducible
private states. We therefore also study properties of the
set of key-undistillable states.
Before stating the main result, we first describe an
intuition, which motivates our approach. Let us sup-
pose, that the state γ⊗nABA′B′ has been attacked by a
hacker Eve i.e. measured on AB part, and Eve has
copied the outcomes. The leftover state is γˆ⊗nABA′B′ =
(
∑
i |ii〉〈ii| ⊗ UiσU†i )⊗n. Intuitively, if γABA′B′ is irre-
ducible, Eve has learned the whole key, as it was located
in its key part. This implies, that the total state γˆ⊗nABA′B′
should not have distillable key. Now, having access to
the ”flags” |ii〉〈ii|AB Alice and Bob can sort the states
σi := UiσU
†
i on systems A
′B′ and get, by the typicality
argument ≈ nd copies of state σ˜ ≡ σ0⊗· · ·⊗σd−1. Hence
the state σ˜ must be also key-undistillable, as obtained
by local operations from the key-undistillable γˆABA′B′ .
We therefore arrive at the intuition that the following
statement about irreducible private states is true:
γABA′B′ is irreducible⇒ KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) = 0. (2)
Negating the RHS of the above we obtain:
KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) > 0⇒ γABA′B′ is reducible. (3)
Now, as the main result, we prove a much stronger, quan-
titative version of the above implication. Namely that for
any private state γABA′B′ , in particular a reducible one,
there is:
KD(γABA′B′) ≥ log d+ 1
d
KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1). (4)
We prove this lower bound by providing explicitly a pro-
tocol achieving the rate of RHS of equation (4).
We then ask if the proposed protocol has an optimal
rate. We prove a new upper bound on it of the form:
KD(γABA′B′) ≤ log d+ 1
d
E∞r (σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1), (5)
where E∞r is the regularized relative entropy of entangle-
ment (the previous upper bound [7, 23] was in terms of∑
iE
∞
r (σi) which is sometimes strictly larger than RHS).
We observe however, that this bound may not be tight
even for irreducible private states. This is because there
may exist entangled key undistillable states. Indeed, since
E∞r (ρ) > 0 iff ρ is entangled i.e. this measure is faithful,
the RHS can differ from LHS in that case by arbitrary
amount.
The problem of whether entangled key undistillable
states exist appears to be non-trivial. We do not judge if
the answer is ”yes”, such states exist or rather ”no”, they
do not. In what follows, much in the spirit of the com-
munity of computer science approaching the P 6= NP
problem, we check what are the possible consequences of
the two answers. Namely, if the answer is ”no” there are
no entangled key undistillable states, then via equation
(4) we have fully characterized the set of irreducible pri-
vate states, and the bound (5) is tight. If however it is
not the case, plenty of questions are ready to be asked.
We study consequences of the mentioned alternative
from the perspective of the upper-bounds on distill-
able key of a private state in terms of measures of en-
tanglement. If the world is such that entangled key-
undistillable states do not exist, then as we noted, the
only irreducible private states are strictly irreducible,
which in fact satisfy KD(γ) = Er(γ), see Figure 1, where
Er is the relative entropy of entanglement [24]. If how-
ever, the world is reach enough, so that such states exist,
there must exists a private state which is not strictly ir-
reducible, that is outside of the set of states satisfying
KD = Er = E
∞
r .
Apart from studying consequences of (non)existence of
entangled key undistillable states, we study the proper-
ties of the set of key-undistillable states Z in general. It
is known, that this set contains all separable i.e. disen-
tangled states, as they can be made from product states
(clearly having KD = 0) by public discussion [25]. Sep-
arable states are far from the private states in the norm
distance; for any private state, with the dimension of the
shield part ds, it holds that [7, 23]:
σ ∈ SEP(dk,ds) ⇒ ||σ − γ||1 ≥ 1− 1√
dk
, (6)
where by SEP(dk,ds) we denote the set of separable states
in the cut AA′ : BB′, and for any X ∈ M(d,C) by
||X||1 ≡ Tr
√
XX† we define its trace norm. What we
are further able to show, is an analogous statement for
states from Z:
σ ∈ Z ⇒ ||σ − γ||1 ≥ 1
6
+
2
3 log d
. (7)
It is much weaker than that from equation (6), but we
pay a price for generality: we do not know the structure
of all key undistillable states, and in derivation we can
use only the fact that σ is key-undistillable.
Let us note here, that the class of irreducible private
states has not been characterized so far, except of its
one subclass called in [26] as strictly irreducible states.
Strictly irreducible states [27] are the private states sat-
isfying that diagonal blocks of the matrix of a private
states, σi ≡ UiσU†i in Eq. (1) are separable for all
i ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}. These states appeared recently in
the problem of quantum key-repeaters. We therefore dis-
cuss also possible further applications of our main result
in this context. Namely M. Christandl and R. Ferrara
have shown in [26] that strictly irreducible private states
have the amount of one-way key-repeaters rate bounded
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FIG. 1: It is a difficult open question if entangled key undis-
tilable states exist. Given answer to this question we follow
what we will know about irreducible private states. On panel
a) we present the situation when entangled zero key states
exist. Then the set of strictly irreducible private states is
a proper subset of all irreducible private states. There also
exists then a private state γ which is irreducible and is be-
yond the set of states {KD = Er} ∪ {KD = E∞r }. On panel
b) we present the situation when entangled key-undistillable
states do not exist. This assumption implies that the set
of strictly irreducible private states equals to the set of irre-
ducible private states and as a consequence we have their full
characterization in this manuscript.
from above by one-way distillable entanglement of γ⊗ γ.
It would be interesting to extend this result to all irre-
ducible private states, and present the answer in terms
of the amount of key achieved via key-repeaters (key-
repeater rate) and distillable entanglement of γ⊗γ. Such
result would answer the question of the role of private
states in key-repeaters. The first important step in this
direction, that we have done is proving that all key undis-
tillable states are bounded away in trace norm from any
private state, since the distance between separable and
private states is crucial to the findings of [26]. This prob-
lem seems to be hard, as there is no evidence that there
even exist states with zero distillable key.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides
definitions that are further used on. Section II contains
the main result, which is a tighter lower bound on distil-
lable key of private states. We present there a protocol
of key distillation which uses both the key part and the
shield of a private state. We also give an upper bound
on its rate. Section III is devoted to some properties of
the set of irreducible private states, including its partial
characterization. In Section IV we provide a lower bound
on distance of key-undistillable states from private states
via the necessary condition of key-undistillability as well
as show its applications to single copy quantum key re-
peaters. In Section V we study approximate irreducible
states in the light of considerations of Section III. The
last section is devoted to the discussion of the above re-
sults.
I. PRIVATE STATES AND IRREDUCIBLE
PRIVATE STATES
In this section we introduce rigorous definitions of pri-
vate states as well as irreducible and strictly irreducible
private states which are crucial in further parts of this
manuscript. One example of a private state is a ba-
sic private state ρABA′B′ , acting on a Hilbert space
CdA ⊗ CdB ⊗ CdA′ ⊗ CdB′ . A basic pdit is of the form
ρABA′B′ ≡ P+AB ⊗ σA′B′ , (8)
where P+AB is a maximally entangled state between onCdA ⊗ CdB , and σA′B′ is an arbitrary bipartitie quantum
state on CdA′ ⊗CdB′ . Imposing now separability of σA′B′
we obtain an example of irreducibly private state. It is
not hard to see that in this case we can extract the secret
key only from the singlet P+AB . Of course both classes
introduced above are of much more richer structure and
below we present their rigorous definitions. Let us start
from the definition of the private state (pdit) [7]:
Definition 1 (of private state). A state ρABA′B′ on a
Hilbert space CdA ⊗ CdB ⊗ CdA′ ⊗ CdB′ with dimensions
dA = dB = d, dA′ and dB′ , of the form
γd ≡ 1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|eifi〉〈ejfj |AB ⊗ UiσA′B′U†j , (9)
where the state σA′B′ is an arbitrary state of subsys-
tem A′B′, U ′is are arbitrary unitary transformations and
{|ei〉}d−1i=0 , {|fj〉}d−1j=0 are local bases on A and B respec-
tively, is called the private state or pdit. In the case of
d = 2, the state in (9) is called - pbit. Further in the
text we will use interchangeably the notation of the pri-
vate state, i.e. γd, γABA′B′ or simply γ, and sometimes
we will drop lower indices when there is no danger of
confusion.
In what follows we will set {|ei〉 ⊗ |fj〉} basis to be
computational for simplicity, while all the facts hold for a
general case of arbitrary product basis of a pdit. The part
AB of a pdit is called the key part, while the subsystem
A′B′ its shield. For any pdit γd ∈ Cd ⊗Cd ⊗CdA′ ⊗CdB′ ,
which is secure in the standard basis by σi for i =
0, . . . , d− 1 we denote states which appear on the shield
of the pdit, after obtaining an outcome |ii〉AB in the mea-
surement performed in the standard basis on its key part.
We call the states σi the conditional states.
We now come to the central definition to all our further
considerations:
Definition 2. Private state γd,d′ is called irreducible iff
KD(γd,d′) = log d. The set of irreducible private states
with local dimension of key part d and total dimension of
the shield part d′, will be denoted as IRd,d′ .
We will sometimes suppress the dimension subscript
from notation in IRd,d′ . Having the private state γ as
4in equation (9), then the state
γˆ :=
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
|ii〉〈ii| ⊗ UiσU†i (10)
is called the key-attacked private state. It is a private
state which has been measured on its key part AB. Now
we are ready to introduce important subset of the IR is
the set of strictly irreducible private states SIR. Denot-
ing by SEP set of bipartite separable states we have the
following:
Definition 3. [26] We say a private state γ is strictly
irreducible if the state γˆ = 1d
∑
i |ii〉〈ii| ⊗ UiσU†i if con-
sists of separable states with respect to the systems on
the shield part on the diagonal, i.e. UiσUi ∈ SEP. We
denote such states as 〈γ〉 or γ〈d〉.
One of the most natural example of strictly irreducible
private state is when we chose in the above definition σ =
1, where 1 is an identity operator on the shield part of γ.
Next, a less trivial example of state within the set SIR
is the ”flower state” γflower [23], which was shown [28]
to lock entanglement cost. We have that γflower ∈ C2 ⊗
C2 ⊗ Cd2 ⊗ Cd2 is of the form:
γflower ≡ 1
2

σ 0 0 1dU
T
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1
dU
∗ 0 0 σ
 , (11)
where σ = 1d
∑d−1
i=0 |ii〉〈ii| is maximally correlated state,
and U =
∑d−1
i,j=0 wij |ii〉〈jj| is the embedding of unitary
transformation W =
∑d−1
i,j=0 wij |i〉〈j| = H⊗ logd with H
being Hadamard transformation.
II. THE MAIN RESULT: PROTOCOL OF
DISTILLING KEY FROM PRIVATE STATES
Here, we will present the protocol which enables the
characterization of irreducible private states. As an-
nounced, it can distill the key not only from the key part
but also from the shield of a private state in the case
where σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 is key distillable. We first show
its rate, which is the main result of this section and the
core of our further reasoning in this manuscript. Here
we state the result for bipartite private states, however
analogues result holds as well for the case of multipartite
private states [6], as we show in Appendix F.
The distillable key can be lower bounded as follows:
Theorem 1. For a private state γd, there is
KD(γd) ≥ log d+ 1
d
KD(σ0 ⊗ σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1). (12)
We achieve the above result via the following proto-
col defined by parameters m and k. The input to the
protocol P (m, k) is γ⊗(m×k). This protocol depends on
a threshold δ(m) which approaches 0 with increasing m.
We fix the value of this threshold later, when study the
rate of this protocol.
1. For each of k blocks of m states Alice and Bob
repeat items 2-6 as follows:
2. Alice and Bob measure their subsystems of the key
part A and B in the secure basis of γ.
3. If number ts(m) of any symbol s ∈ {0, ..., d− 1} in
the key |i0〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |im〉 with ij ∈ {0, ..., d − 1} is
below the threshold δ(m), i.e. |md − ts(m)| > δ(m),
they trace out the original state, produce the error
state |e〉AA′ ⊗|e〉BB′ . They then proceed with step
2 on the next block if such is left, or go directly to
step 7 otherwise. If however |md − ts(m)| ≤ δ(m)
for all s, they proceed with the steps 4 − 6 of the
protocol.
4. Alice and Bob perform each control-permutation
operation: depending on the value of the key |i0〉⊗
· · · ⊗ |im〉 with ij ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} they permute
states on the systems A′B′ from its original form
σi0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σim to σ⊗t0(m)0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ⊗td−1(m)d−1 .
5. If necessary Alice and Bob trace out some of the
states σ0, . . . , σd leaving only tmin(m) = bmd −
δ(m)c of copies of the state σ˜ ≡ σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1.
6. As a subprotocol, Alice and Bob perform on sys-
tems A′B′ any optimal key distillation protocol of
the state σ˜, acting on σ˜⊗tmin(m), with output close
in the trace norm to the state γA′B′A′′B′′ . The state
on systems AB from the item 3 and state on sys-
tems A′B′A′′B′′ form one of the k input states for
the final step 7 of the protocol.
7. On k output states of the k repetitions of items
2-6 (or items 2− 3 if unsuccessful in item 3 respec-
tively) Alice and Bob perform the Devetak-Winter
protocol [29].
Sketch of the proof. The detailed proof of Theorem 1 is
given in Appendix B.We also refer reader to Figure 2
on which we present the performance of our protocol for
the finite and fixed number of input states. We provide
here briefly the idea. First let us note, that if the state
σ˜ = σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 is key-undistillable, then there is
obvious protocol of distilling log d of key from γd : just
via measuring its key part. Hence, in case KD(σ˜) = 0,
our bound is trivially satisfied. Thus, in what follows we
will assume that KD(σ˜) > 0. It is intuitive that given
the key from key part has been used, there are remaining
states on the shield part. The major obstacle is that these
two parts are correlated. We overcome this problem in
steps 2− 4.
In the first step (item 2) the parties get to know the
value of the key on key part. The next step (item 3)
shows that our protocol is of the kind ”all versus noting”:
5if the key has atypical value (having too small number
of some of the symbols 0, . . . , d − 1), the parties trace
out the whole state, create the error flags and proceed
with step 2 for the next of k blocks. This however occurs
extremely rarely due to concentration property of inde-
pendent, identically distributed random variables. Hence
with probability almost one, the key value is typical, and
Alice and Bob proceed with the main step of the protocol
(item 4).
In the fourth step they decouple the key part and the
shield by sorting conditional states on the shield part:
all states labelled with 0 together, up to d− 1. The only
correlations which survive between the system AB and
A′B′ are due to the type that is how many symbols 0’s,
1’s up to d − 1’s are in the value of the key on system
AB.
The next step (item 5) is provided for technical rea-
sons, as it allows for easy calculation of the rate of the
protocol. In the pre-last step Alice and Bob perform a
key distillation protocol on tmin(m) copies of the state
σ˜ = σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 which, by definition, ends up with
a state close to some private state γA′B′A′′B′′ . The state
on ABA′B′A′′B′′ has now the perfect key on A′B′ and
the partially secure key on AB about which Eve knows
the type that is a number of symbols in the string of the
value of this key. Fortunately, this knowledge has very
low entropy, sub-linear in m, and will not affect the total
rate of the protocol.
After repeating steps 2 − 6 k times (or items 2 −
3 if unsuccessful in item 3 respectively), in the last
step Alice and Bob perform the Devetak-Winter pro-
tocol on the subsystems AA′BB′ of k such obtained
states [29]. It then remains to check that the rate of
the Devetak-Winter protocol reads in this case approx-
imately r(m, k) = k(m log d − (m + d − 1)h( mm+d−1 ) +
tmin(m)KD(σ˜)−o(m))−o(k). The first term corresponds
to m log d bits of initial ideal key on AB however it is low-
ered by the second term (m+ d− 1)h( mm+d−1 ). The lat-
ter corresponds to Eve’s knowledge of the type. Indeed,
there are no more than(
m+ d− 1
m
)
≤ 2(m+d−1)h( mm+d−1 ) (13)
of different types of strings of length m of symbols from
d-ary alphabet [30]. The third term tmin(m)KD(σ˜) is
the rate of the protocol of key distillation from tmin(m)
copies of state σ˜. Hence, choosing properly value of
δ(m) approaching 0 with m going to infinity (see Ap-
pendix B), we obtain that the rate of our protocol which
is 1mk r(m, k) reaches asymptotically (taking m, k →∞)
value log d+ 1dKD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1), as claimed. uunionsq
From theorem 1 we have immediate important corol-
lary which is in fact a necessary condition for irreducibil-
ity:
Corollary 1. For any irreducible private state γ of the
FIG. 2: On this figure we present performance of the protocol
from Theorem 1 for n = 5 copies of the private pbit γ. Single
private state γ is represented as a collection of four dots. By
smaller green dots we denote qubits forming the key part of
pbit and by larger yellow its respective shield part. At the
beginning Alice and Bob measure their subsystems of the key
part A and B in the secure basis of γ obtaining respective bit
strings 00, 11, 00, 11, 00. Assuming that parties can proceed
(3rd point from Theorem 1 is not fulfilled.), they perform con-
trol sorting depending on the value of the key by permuting
states on the parts A′B′ obtaining σ0 ⊗ σ0 ⊗ σ0 ⊗ σ1 ⊗ σ1,
and eventually tracing out some of their subsystems. Hav-
ing that, parties perform on systems A′B′ any optimal key
distillation protocol. Finally, after k repetitions of items 2-6
from the protocol, Alice and Bob perform the Devetak-Winter
protocol on systems AA′BB′ obtaining 1 + 1
2
KD(σ0 ⊗ σ1) of
key.
form
1
d
∑
ij
|ii〉〈jj| ⊗ UiσUj (14)
there is
KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) = 0. (15)
6In particular we have
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} KD(σi) = 0, (16)
where σi = UiσU
†
i .
We note here that our protocol needs for a pdit γd
by definition a huge number of its copies: ks for some
parameter s, s and k increasing asymptotically. It is
really huge, in comparison with the fact that one can get
log d of key from a single copy of γd by measuring its key
part. However, it shows what can be done in general,
asymptotically, which allows to study the distillable key
of reducible private states: so that it works, this number
is larger than d3/2 log d′.
It is tempting to ask if the protocol that we proposed is
optimal. In what follows we will improve the bounds on
relative entropy of entanglement for private states which
will show to what extend performance of our protocol is
not tight. So far the following bound was known [7, 23]:
KD(γ) ≤ E∞r (γ) ≤ log d+
1
d
∑
i
E∞r (σi). (17)
In the next theorem we present a bit tighter bound. The
fact that it is tighter comes from the subadditivity of Er.
The proof of it is directly inspired by the protocol from
the above section.
Theorem 2. For any pdit γd,d′ we have
E∞r (γABA′B′) ≤ log d+
1
d
E∞r (σ˜) , (18)
where σ˜ = σ0 ⊗ σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 and σi are conditional
states on A′B′ for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}.
III. PROPERTIES OF THE SET OF
IRREDUCIBLE PRIVATE STATES
Recall that by IRd,d′ we denote the set of irreducible
private states with the dimension of key d ⊗ d and that
of shield d′ ⊗ d′. Not to overload notation, we will omit
the dimensions writing IR if some fact holds for any
fixed dimensions or the dimensions are known from the
context. It is natural to imagine that the key obtained
from two different states from IR is no greater than the
sum of the keys from each of them. In what follows we
will prove this for certain subsets of IR.
We are now going to show an important example where
the above observation applies, firstly by formulating the
following:
Observation 1. The following sets are closed under the
tensor product.
R ≡ {ρ : KD(ρ) = Er(ρ)}, (19)
R∞ ≡ {ρ : KD(ρ) = E∞r (ρ)}, (20)
I ≡ {ρ : KD(ρ) = Isq(ρ)}, (21)
where Er is the relative entropy of entanglement, KD is
the distillable key, and Isq is the squashed entanglement
measure.
Because the tensor product of two private states is
again a private state (up to a local unitary transformation
[26]), by the above observation as an immediate conse-
quence we have that Rir, Rir,∞, and Iir which are inter-
sections of the set of irreducibly private states IR with
respective sets from Observation 1, are closed under the
tensor product.
Moreover, the above sets are obviously non-empty, and
have a non-empty intersections. Indeed, let us fix di-
mensions and consider: Rir(d, d′) = IRd,d′ ∩ R(d, d′),
Rir,∞ = IRd,d′ ∩ R∞(d, d′) and Iir(d, d′) = IRd,d′ ∩
I(d, d′).
|ψ+〉 ⊗ σ′d ∈ Rir(d, d′) ∩Rir,∞(d, d′) ∩ Iir(d, d′) (22)
for any dimension d′, where |ψ+〉 = 1√d
∑
i |ii〉, that is
a maximally entangled state and σ′d is an arbitrary d
′2-
dimensional separable state. In other words, all three sets
have in their mutual intersection the set of basic private
state with a separable shield.
Let us note here, that there is Rir(2, d′) 6= Iir(2, d′)
for any dimension d′. This is because the class of states
”flower state” γf which are pbits with d dimensional
shield satisfy Er(γf ) = 1 but Isq(γf ) = 1 +
log d
2 [31].
A. Irreducible private states vs existence of bound
key states
We say that a quantum state ρ has the bound dis-
tillable key if KD(ρ) = 0 and ρ is entangled. It is a
widely open problem if such states exist. If so, entan-
glement and secrecy would be different resources. We
are far from solving it; we rather connect this with the
problem of studying the irreducible private states. One
might think, that existence of bound-key states implies
that some irreducible private states are beyond the set
R trivially (see Observation 1). Indeed, if bound key
state exists, say ρbk, then a basic pdit |ψ+〉〈ψ+| ⊗ ρbk is
example of such a state. There are however two issues:
firstly it is not clear what is the lower bound on Er in
this case, as this measure is subadditive. Secondly, and
more importantly, it is not clear that KD of this state
equals log d. This is because, in principle, the singlet
state could act as a catalyst unblocking the key of ρbk
(key is by definition superadditive). Therefore it is not
immediate to construct an irreducible private state out-
side of the set R which is irreducible, basing solely on the
fact that there exists some bound key state, and even not
easy to show that it exists. In what follows, however, we
show that such a state must exists in that case. More
precisely, if there are no bound key states, we have the
full characterization of the set IR:
Clearly, we have Rir ⊆ IR. We consider now the
condition under which the converse inclusion holds.
7Proposition 1. The set Rir does not equal set of irre-
ducibly private states if and only if there exists a state
with the bound key. The same holds for the set Rir,∞ in
place of Rir.
We have then immediate corollary characterizing the
set of irreducible private states of arbitrary dimension of
the key part d and qubit dimension d′ = 2 of the shield.
Additionally, in the particular case of qubit key part,
d = 2 we are able to calculate log-negativity of these
states.
Corollary 2. The set of irreducible private bits IRd,2
consists of the strictly irreducible pdits, that is those
states γd =
1
d
∑d−1
i=0 |ii〉〈ii| ⊗ UiσU†i for which there is:
U0σU
†
0 , . . . , Ud−1σU
†
d−1 ∈ SEP. (23)
Moreover, for d = 2 with X = U0σU
†
1 , there is EN (γ2) =
log
(
1 + ||XΓ||1
)
where Γ denotes the partial transposi-
tion and EN is the log-negativity entanglement measure.
The above corollary in particular holds for the strictly
irreducible pbits, considered in [26]. We note that the
form of the matrix in (2) implies that all diagonal blocks
of the matrix of a private bit from IR2,2 are separable.
Remark 1. If Proposition 1 was true for some entangle-
ment measure M and then was a state γ ∈ RM \Rir then
it would imply existence of bound key state. Although we
know that Iir 6= Rir, in the case of Isq the analogue of
Proposition 1 is not true in general as the analogue of the
bound (C2) does not hold e.g. for the mentioned flower
state γf .
To ensure that the state σ from (23) is separa-
ble after the action of an arbitrary unitary operations
{U0, U1, . . . , Ud−1} is enough to take σ from the set of
the absolutely separable states ASEP [32, 33]. Such an
idea of the construction was proposed in [27], but with-
out an explicit presentation of allowed classes of states.
Here we construct an explicit class of above mentioned
states in qubit-qubit case and we show by counterex-
ample, which is different that previously known ”flower
state” γflower [23, 28], that such class does not saturate
all possible choices.
The problem of the absolute separability or the sep-
arability from the spectrum [34–37] asks for a charac-
terization of the states ρ ∈ Cd ⊗ Cd, such that UρU† is
separable for all unitary matrices U . We know that such
full characterization was done for the qubit-qubit [36]
case and then it was generalized for the qubit-qudit case
[37]. Here, as we mentioned, we restrict ourselves to the
case of the two qubits by recalling the following theorem
from [36]:
Theorem 3. Consider the state ρ ∈ C2 ⊗ C2. Let
spec↓(ρ) = {λi : i = 1, . . . , 4} be a set of eigenvalues of
ρ in a non-increasing order, then the state is absolutely
separable if and only if its eigenvalues satisfy
λ1 ≤ λ3 + 2
√
λ2λ4. (24)
We see that thanks to (3) by putting states σ from (2)
satisfying (24) we always get an irreducible pbit. Private
pbits obtained by twisting of absolutely separable state
together with a singlet form the set T AS, see Figure 3.
Of course we can find a state ω /∈ ASEP and non-local
twisting operations for which conditions in (23) are ful-
filled. We illustrate this by the following example:
Example 1. Let us consider a separable state
ω =
1
4
 1 · · 1· 1 1 ·· 1 1 ·
1 · · 1
 , (25)
which is not absolutely separable, since the condition
(24) does not hold. This means that there exists a uni-
tary transformation U for which UωU† is entangled,
so ωΓ =
(
UρU†
)Γ  0, where Γ denotes the opera-
tion of the partial transposition with respect to one of
the subsystems [38, 39]. On the other hand, there ex-
ist non-local unitary operations V , such that condition
ωΓ =
(
V ωV †
)Γ ≥ 0 holds - this means that the state
V ωV † is separable. Here we provide the family of such
operations V
V =
 · · 1 ·s −c · ·c s · ·
· · · −1
 , (26)
where c = cos(θ) and s = sin(θ) for θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. It is
easy to see that ωΓ =
(
V ωV †
)Γ ≥ 0, which means that
V ωV † ∈ SEP. The unitary transformation V is indeed
non-local, since after an action on the separable state
ω˜ =
1
2
 1 · · ·· · · ·· · · ·
· · · 1
 (27)
we get
(
V ω˜V †
)Γ  0. Private states γ(ω) constructed by
the use of the state ω form equation (25) and twisting op-
erations from (26) are outside of the set T AS (twisted ab-
solutely separable states), but still within the set of strictly
irreducible pbits SIR, see Figure 3.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE
KEY-UNDISTILLABLE STATES
In this section for the first time we investigate prop-
erties of the conditional states of the irreducible private
states without presenting their explicit form. For the key-
attacked state of an irreducible private state we are able
to show even more, namely their key-undistillability. We
then show a lower bound on the trace distance between
the key-undistillable and private states.
8FIG. 3: Within the set of all strictly irreducible private states
of dimension 4 ⊗ 4 we distinguish the set T AS of twisted
absolutely separable private states. States from T AS are ob-
tained by twisting a singlet together with an absolutely sep-
arable state on the shield part. We see that outside of T AS
but still within the set of strictly irreducible private states
SIR we can find the ”flower state” γflower as well as class of
the private states γ(ω) constructed in Example 1.
Observation 2. The key-attacked state γˆ of an irre-
ducible private state γ is key-undistillable. The same
holds for γˆ⊗n for n ≥ 2.
Having an operation of mapping a bipartite state on
systems AB to a classical-classical-quantum (ccq) state
on systems ABE from [27] (or see Section A 4 of Ap-
pendix A ) we are ready now for an attempt to consider
a general question, interesting on its own: how far are the
key-undistillable states from the private states? We base
on the proof of a lower bound on distillable key given in
[40] (see [27] for more elaborative explanation):
Theorem 4. [27, 40] For any bipartite state ρAB there
is:
KD(ρAB) ≥ CDW ((ρpsq)ccq) , (28)
where ρpsq is the privacy squeezed state of the state ρ.
We will now generalize the above theorem to obtain the
necessary condition of key-undistillability, which in fact
can be viewed as non-one-way-key-distillability. In what
follows by Z we will denote the set of key-undistillable
states, where the dimension is assumed to be understood
from the context.
Theorem 5. For any key-undistillable state ρ ∈ Z,
and for any local unitary transformations U1 and U2
which act on ρ so that U1 ⊗ U2ρU†1 ⊗ U†2 =: ρABA′B′ ,
as well as any unitary transformation of the form U =∑
ij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ U (ij)A′B′ there is:
CDW
((
TrA′B′UρABA′B′U
†)
ccq
)
≤ 0, (29)
where the ccq state is w.r.t. to the computational basis
{|ij〉}.
The above theorem will allow us to prove a lower bound
on distance between key-undistillable states and private
states, improving the result of [27] where a dual fact is
proved, namely that the states closer to private bits by
δ < 0.001 are key distillable.
Theorem 6. For any state which has KD(ρ) = 0, and
any private state γ with the d⊗ d dimensional key-part:
||ρ− γ||1 ≥ z(d) (30)
with
z(d) = inf
1≥≥0
{
 :  ≥ 1
6
− 2η()
3 log d
}
, (31)
where η(x) = −x log x.
Having above theorem, let us mention an easy corol-
lary.
Corollary 3. For any private state γd, there is:
inf
Λ∈LOCC
inf
ρ∈Z
||Λ(ρ)− γd||1 ≥ 1
6
− 2
3 log d
. (32)
The state Λ(ρ) and γd in the above are assumed to be
properly embedded so that their dimensions are compati-
ble.
For such a choice of embedding as described in above
proof any operation applied initially to states ρd1 , γd has
to be extended by the identity operator 1 acting on ad-
ditional subsystems. Further we always understand such
extensions as a part of the shield in the case of private
states.
With a bit of self criticism let us note that the bound
in Theorem 6 is actually small, reaching asymptotically
limd→∞ z(d) = 1/6 = 0.1(6) as 1/ log d instead of 1/d,
although perhaps our considerations can be improved by
more careful approach. The bound however is non-trivial
even for the smallest d = 2, with the value 0.041. It is
worth to mention here that proof of theorem 6 can be
recalculated also for embedded private state γ′ ≡ γd ⊗
|0〉〈0|⊗2d1 as it is described in the proof of corollary 3 and
below it. Namely, the only thing we have to do is treat
additional subsystems |0〉〈0|⊗2d1 as a part of the shield.
Then partial trace in expression D3 is well defined as
well as untwisting operation U .
After completing this paper authors where pointed to
paper [41], where estimation tighter than in (D2) is pre-
sented. Unfortunately, in the limit case both approaches
lead to the same value of the lower bound.
V. APPROXIMATE IRREDUCIBLE PRIVATE
STATES
We note that there is a natural way to define approxi-
mate irreducible private states as follows (compare with
[26], where approximate strictly reducible private states
were defined):
Definition 4. The state ρ is called -approximate irre-
ducible private state if it satisfies ||ρ − γ˜d,d′ ||1 ≤  for
some irreducible private state γ˜d,d′ .
9A natural property that we would expect from the ap-
proximate irreducible private states is that they have the
distillable key close to log d. We prove a weaker condi-
tion, namely only for states that approximate those irre-
ducible private states which are from the set Rir,M with
M being asymptotically continuous and bound on the
distillable key. The bound then applies for Er, E
∞
r , Isq as
they are all asymptotically continuous, and upper bound
KD. To be precise, in what follows by asymptotic con-
tinuity of M we mean the fact that for any two states
satisfying ||ρ− ρ′|| =  ≤ 1 there is:
|M(ρ)−M(ρ′)| ≤ O( log d+ h()) (33)
where h is the binary Shannon entropy, and the constant
in O(·) notation is independent of the dimension d.
Observation 3. For an -approximate irreducible pri-
vate state ρ with  ≤ 0.367879 there is:
KD(ρ) ≥ log d− 6 log d− 4η(), (34)
where η(x) = −x log x. If it also satisfies ||ρ − γ˜||1 ≤ 
such that γ˜ ∈ Rir,M where M is asymptotically continu-
ous and M ≥ KD, then there is:
KD(ρ) ≤ log d+O( log d+ h()). (35)
In particular it is true for M ∈ {Er, E∞r , Isq}.
Let us note here, that if we are not interested in opti-
mal constants in the formulation of the asymptotic conti-
nuity, then the above observation can be stated in much
compressed way. Namely that for ||ρ−γd|| ≤  ≤ 12 there
is:
|KD(ρ)− log d| ≤ O( log d+ h()), (36)
if only γd ∈ Rir,M with M ≥ KD and M asymptotic
continuous.
Finally, it is interesting to note, that there are pri-
vate states γd, for which it is not known if they are
-approximate irreducible private states, but they pos-
sess the major property of the latter, namely |KD(γd)−
log d| ≤ . We leave as an open question if the states with
that property are indeed the -irreducible private states,
and invoke now the construction of a private state which
has this property. To begin with, we consider a family of
states on
C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ (Cd˜k ⊗ Cd˜k)⊗m given in [5]:
ρˆp,d˜,k,m =
1
Nm

[p( τ1+τ22 )]
⊗m 0 0 [p( τ1−τ22 )]
⊗m
0 [( 12 − p)τ2]⊗m 0 0
0 0 [( 12 − p)τ2]⊗m 0
[p( τ1−τ22 )]
⊗m
0 0 [p( τ1+τ22 )]
⊗m
 , (37)
where Nm = 2(p
m) + 2
(
1
2 − p
)m
, τ1 =
(
ρa+ρs
2
)⊗k
and
τ2 = (ρs)
⊗k, while ρs and ρa are the d˜-dimensional sym-
metric and antisymmetric Werner state, respectively.
The state ρˆp,d˜,k,m is PPT iff p ≤ 13 and 1−pp ≥
(
d˜
d˜−1
)k
[5]. We satisfy this condition by setting p = 13 , d˜ = m
2
and k = m, as then
(
d˜
d˜−1
)k
< 2 for m ≥ 2. Then we
define
ρm := ρˆ1/3,m2,m,m, (38)
with m ≥ 2.
Now in the proof of Corollary 23 of [19] it is shown (to-
gether with construction), that there exists γ such that
||ρm − γ||1 ≤ f(), where f() = 2
√
4
√
2+ η
(
2
√
2
)
+
2
√
2 where  = 23
(
1− (1− 12m )m × 11+ 12m ).
We will argue now that this γ is the O(exp(−m))-
almost irreducible private state. For the upper bound
on KD(γ) we note that by Lemma 24 of [19] there is
KD(γ) ≤ Ef (γ) ≤ 1 +O(exp(−m)), where Ef is the en-
tanglement of formation measure. On the other hand the
state is private, hence KD(γ) ≥ 1 by the definition.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have considered distillation of the key from private
states with non-trivial shield part. We have provided the
first protocol, which distills the key not only from the key
part of the private state but also exploits its shield. The
protocol is rather intuitive: in the first step we decouple
the key part and the shield by ”sorting” the states on the
shield conditionally on the value of the key on key part.
In the second one we distill the key from the states on
shield, and to the total output state of the original key
part and resulting the state we apply the Devetak-Winter
protocol. It is plausible, that the protocol is optimal,
however we have proven only a better bound on its rate
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which reads:
log d+
1
d
E∞r (σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1). (39)
It would be interesting to amen this question. We also
leave the problem open whether our protocol has rate
close to (12), when run on an approximate irreducible
private state. At first it seems possible, as CDW is asymp-
totically continuous, yet our protocol uses as subprotocol
an optimal one for distillation of state σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1,
which need not yield optimal value on a close by state to
the latter.
The presented protocol allowed us to characterize the
irreducible private states - those for which distillable key
equals a logarithm of the dimension of the key part.
These states in matrix form have key-undistillable states
on diagonal. Formally, for a private is irreducible if and
only if
γ =
1
d
∑
ij
|ii〉〈jj| ⊗ UiσU†j (40)
with KD
(
UiσU
†
i
)
= 0, that is, its conditional states are
key-undistillable. In turn the private states with 2 ⊗ 2
dimensional key part and shield are only strictly irre-
ducible. To further characterize them, we observe, that
the latter form strictly larger set than the set based on
absolutely separable states as proposed in [27].
A major problem left over, which stays behind our
considerations is whether there exist entangled key-
undistillable states. We show, that if they do not exist,
then the class of irreducible private states collapses to the
class of strictly irreducible ones, having KD = Er. If not,
then we may have other subsets, with KD = M where M
is some entanglement measure which is an upper bound
on KD, like E
∞
r and Isq. We show that these sets have
useful property of being closed under tensor product.
Finally our result may lead to the generalization of
one of the results of [26]. It is shown there that the one-
way key repeater rate of any strictly irreducible states
γ (in two copies) R→D (γ ⊗ γ) is upper bounded by the
one-way distillable entanglement E→D (γ ⊗ γ) (see defini-
tions in Appendix A 3). The result of Ferrara and Chri-
standl [26] in a part bases on the fact [7], that the dis-
tance between separable and private states approaches
1 exponentially fast in number of qubits that the states
occupy. Since it works for separable states, only strictly
irreducible private states were considered there [26]. It
is an open question if our new bound on distance be-
tween key undistillable states and private ones may lead
to analogous bound on repeated key of any irreducible
private state. Answering this question would show that
irreducible private states are useless for transferring key
for long distances unless they have high distillable entan-
glement.
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Appendix A: Auxiliary definitions from the main text
1. Entanglement measures and distillable key
Here, we introduce all entanglement measures which are employed in this manuscript. Additionally, the definition
of the distillable key is also given.
Definition 5. The relative entropy of entanglement for an arbitrary density operator ρ is defined as
Er(ρ) ≡ inf
ω∈SEP
D(ρ|ω), (A1)
where the infimum runs over the set of separable states SEP, and D(·|·) denotes relative entropy, i.e. D(ρ|σ) ≡
Trρ log ρ− Trρ log σ, for an arbitrary density operators ρ, σ.
Definition 6. The regularized relative entropy of entanglement for an arbitrary density operator ρ is defined as
E∞r (ρ) ≡ lim
n→∞
1
n
Er
(
ρ⊗n
)
, (A2)
where Er is the relative entropy of entanglement given in (5).
Definition 7. The squashed entanglement [42] for an arbitrary bipartite sate ρAB is defined as
Isq (ρAB) ≡ inf
ρABE
{
1
2
I(A;B|E) | ρABE extension of ρAB
}
. (A3)
The infimum is taken over all extensions of ρAB, i.e. over all density operators ρABE with ρAB = TrEρABE. By
I(A;B|E) ≡ S(AE) + S(BE) − S(ABE) − S(E) we denote the quantum conditional mutual information of ρABE
[43]. S(A) ≡ S(ρA) is the von Neumann entropy of the underlying state.
Definition 8. The distillable key for an arbitrary bipartite state ρAB is defined as the rate at which private states
can be distilled under bipartite LOCC operations ΛA:B[5]:
KD (ρAB) ≡ lim
→0
lim
n→∞ supΛA:B
{
K :
∣∣∣∣Λ (ρ⊗n)− γnK∣∣∣∣
1
≤ } , (A4)
where || · ||1 denotes the trace norm.
Definition 9. For an arbitrary bipartite state ρAB by distillable entanglement [44] we understand the following
quantity:
ED(ρAB) ≡ sup
{
r : lim
n→∞
[
inf
Λ
∣∣∣∣Λ(ρ⊗nAB)− Φ(2rn)∣∣∣∣1] = 0} , (A5)
where Λ denotes trace preserving bipartite LOCC map and Φ(2rn) denotes maximally entangled state of Schmidt rank
2rn. The distillable entanglement of a state ρAB can be understood as the rate at which maximally entanglement states
can be distilled under bipartite LOCC operations.
2. Distillable classical key
Let us recall here the definition of the distillable classical key, which we adapt from [7].
Definition 10. The classical distillable key for any given state ρABE ∈ B(HA ⊗HB ⊗HC) is defined as the rate at
which private states can be distilled under bipartite LOPC operations (local operations and public communication -
the difference between the standard local operations and classical communication (LOCC) and LOPC lies in the fact
that in the latter we need to remember that any classical message announced by the involved parties may be registered
by Eve) Λ′A:BE[7]:
CD (ρAB) ≡ lim
→0
lim
n→∞ supΛ′A:BE
{
K :
∣∣∣∣Λ′ (ρ⊗n)− (ρ)nKccq ∣∣∣∣1 ≤ } , (A6)
where || · ||1 denotes the trace norm.
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The above definition works for any input tripartite state ρABE . However, in the case where the total state is pure,
we observe that the latter is determined by the state ρAB = TrEρABE up to unitary transformations on Eve’s side.
Since from the very definition CD does not change under such transformations, the latter freedom is not an issue, so
that we can say the state ρAB completely determines the total state. Thus, we get definition of distillable classical
secure key from bipartite state ρAB
Definition 11. For given bipartite state ρAB the distillable classical secure key is given by
CD(ρAB) ≡ CD(ψABE), (A7)
where ψABE is the purification of ρAB.
3. Definition of key one-way swapping rate and one-way distillable entanglement
In this section, for the sake of completeness, we recall the definition of the one-way key swapping rate introduced
in [26] and one-way distillable entanglement used by us in discussion.
Definition 12. For all bipartite states ρ and ρ˜, we define the one-way key swapping rate achieved with one-way key
swapping protocols as:
R→D (ρ, ρ˜) ≡ lim
δ→0
→0
˜→0
lim
n→∞ supΛC→A:B
ΓC→A
Γ˜C′→B
{
R : TrCΛ
(
γ〈nr〉 ⊗ γ〈nr˜〉
)
≈δ γnR, Γ(ρ⊗n) ≈ γ〈nr〉, Γ˜(ρ˜⊗n) ≈˜ γ〈nr˜〉
}
,
(A8)
where by γ〈nr˜〉, γ〈nr〉 we denote the strictly irreducible private state with dimension of the key part dnr˜e and dnre
respectively, by γnR the private state with dimension of the key part equal to dnRe. Moreover, by ΛC→A:B ,ΓC→A and
Γ˜C′→B we denote one-way swapping protocols acting on respective subsystems.
Definition 13. For all bipartite states ρ we define one-way distillable entanglement
E→D ≡= lim
→0
lim
n→∞ supΛA→B
{
E : Λ
(
ρ⊗n
) ≈ ΦABinE} , (A9)
where maps ΛA→B are restricted to one-way LOCC and ΦAB is maximally entangled state between A and B.
In the above expressions we use the notation ρ ≈ σ for ||ρ− σ||1 ≤  to compress the definitions.
4. Classical-classical-quantum states and privacy squeezing
Definition 14. For a bipartite state ρABA′B′ its ccq state with respect to system AB and basis B = {|ei〉 ⊗ |fj〉} is
the state
(ρ)ccq ≡ TrA′B′
∑
ij
Pi ⊗Qj ⊗ 1E |ψρ〉〈ψρ|Pi ⊗Qj ⊗ 1E
 , (A10)
where Pi ≡ |ei〉〈ei| ⊗ 1A′B′ and Qj = |fj〉〈fj | ⊗ 1A′B′ , while |ψρ〉 is a purification of the state ρAB to system E. In
case when the system A′B′ is absent, we say that (ρ)ccq is a ccq state of ρ with respect to basis B.
Let us note here, that such defined ccq state is not unique, however any two ccq states of ρ can differ only by an
isometry on system E, hence the secure content of them is the same, as such operation is at hand of Eve, and is
reversible. In particular we may fix for the rest of our considerations that we use the standard purification:∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|AB 7→
∑
i
√
pi|ψi〉AB ⊗ |i〉E . (A11)
An important fact for what follows is that the twisting with control basis B = {|ei〉 ⊗ |fi〉} (that is unitary
U =
∑
ij |ei〉〈ei| ⊗ |fj〉〈fj |AB ⊗ U (ei,fj)A′B′ ) does not change the ccq state with respect to system AB and basis B of a
given state ρABA′B′ ([7], see also Theorem 3.3 of [27]). Formally we have:
(UρABA′B′U
†)ccq = (ρABA′B′)ccq. (A12)
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We note now that the rate of the one-way Devetak-Winter protocol on some ccq state ρ which we invoke in Theorem
1 reads:
CDW (ρccq) ≡ I(A : B)ρccq − I(A : E)ρccq , (A13)
where I(X : Y )ρ is the (quantum) mutual information of a state of X,Y subsystem of the state ρccq. For the more
formal definition of CDW (the classical distillable key) we refer to Section A 2 of this appendix.
Finally, let us recall the notion of privacy squeezed state [7]. It involves the operation of privacy squeezing. Privacy
squeezing of ρ according to basis {|ei〉⊗|fj〉} is composition of (i) operation of the form U =
∑
ij |ei〉〈ei|AB⊗|fj〉〈fj |⊗
U
(ei,fj)
A′B′ with certain special U
(ei,fj) defined by the state ρ and subsequently (ii) tracing out the subsystem A′B′. The
result of this operation is called the privacy squeezed state of ρ.
Appendix B: Proofs from Section II
First, we are going to prove here the main theorem of the manuscript, namely that we have a protocol that can
distill key not only from the key part but also from the shield of a private state in case where σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 is
distillable.
Let us recall that it key rate is given the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For a private state γd, there is
KD(γ) ≥ log d+ 1
d
KD(σ0 ⊗ σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1). (B1)
Recall that the input to the protocol P (m, k) is γ
⊗(mk)
d , where γ is a private state with d ⊗ d dimensional key
part. The private state γd has also finite dimensional shield, which without loss of generality we may assume to be of
dimension d′ ⊗ d′. Parameters m and k will be chosen later. We first recall the protocol:
1. For each of k blocks of m states Alice and Bob repeat items 2-6 as follows:
2. Alice and Bob measure their subsystems of the key part A and B.
3. If number ts(m) of any symbol s ∈ {0, ..., d− 1} in the key |i0〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |im〉 with ij ∈ {0, ..., d− 1} is below the
threshold δ(m), i.e. |md −ts(m)| > δ(m), they trace out the original state, produce the error state |e〉AA′⊗|e〉BB′ .
They then proceed with step 2 on the next block if such is left, or go directly to step 7 otherwise. If however
|md − ts(m)| ≤ δ(m) for all s, they proceed with the steps 4− 6 of the protocol.
4. Alice and Bob perform each control-permutation operation: depending on the value of the key |i0〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |im〉
with ij ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} they permute states on the systems A′B′ from its original form σi0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σim to
σ
⊗t0(m)
0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ⊗td−1(m)d−1 .
5. If necessary Alice and Bob trace out some of the states σ0, . . . , σd leaving only tmin(m) = bmd − δ(m)c of copies
of the state σ˜ ≡ σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1.
6. As a subprotocol, Alice and Bob perform on systems A′B′ any optimal key distillation protocol of the state σ,
acting on (σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1)⊗tmin(m), with output close in the trace norm to the state γA′B′A′′B′′ . The state on
systems AB from the item 3 and state on systems A′B′A′′B′′ form one of the k input states for the final step 7
of the protocol.
7. On k output states of the k repetitions of items 2-6 (or items 2− 3 if unsuccessful in item 3 respectively) Alice
and Bob perform the Devetak-Winter protocol [29].
As it was argued in the main text, in what follows, we can w.l.g. assume KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) > 0, as otherwise
the bound from theorem is trivially satisfied without need for the above protocol.
We will now examine how the output state of the protocol looks like. Let us fix some δ′(m) > 0. As we already
noticed, we start from a pbit γ⊗mABA′B′E . In what follows we will write |ψ〉 instead of |ψ〉〈ψ| to simplify the notation.
After projection on the key part and control-sorting of the key part and shield, the state is:
∑
t∈G
|Qt|
dm
∑
i∈Qt
1
|Qt| |ii〉〈ii|AB
⊗ |ψ0〉⊗t0(m) ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψd−1〉⊗td−1(m) + pB |e〉AA′ ⊗ |e〉BB′ ⊗ |e〉E . (B2)
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Here |ψ0〉 is purification of σ0 = U0σA′B′U†0 , and similar for |ψk〉 for k ∈ {0, . . . , d−1}. The multi-index i = (i1, . . . , im),
where ij ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, the set G is the set of types satisfying |ts − 1d | ≤ δ(m) for all s ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, and the set
of all strings i of the type t is denoted as Qt. To simply the notation, we will write Eq. (B2) as∑
t∈G
p(t)ρt ⊗ |ψ0〉⊗t0(m) ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψd−1〉⊗td−1(m) + pB |e〉AA′ ⊗ |e〉BB′ ⊗ |e〉E , (B3)
where p(t) = |Qt|dm and ρt =
∑
i∈Qt
1
|Qt| |ii〉〈ii|AB . Moreover we have
pB = 1−
∑
t∈G
p(t). (B4)
The state |e〉AA′ ⊗ |e〉BB′ ⊗ |e〉E′ is an error state produced when there are too little of σ0 . . . σd−1. From properties
of types, there is pB ≤ p(m) [30] with
p(m) = 2
−m
(
δ(m)2
2 ln 2 −d log(m+1)m
)
, (B5)
i.e. decays exponentially fast with m. Moreover the cardinality of the set T of all types reads the following value and
a bound:
|T | =
(
m+ d− 1
m
)
≤ 2(m+d−1)h( mm+d−1 ), (B6)
where h is the Shannon binary entropy.
According to item 5 of the protocol Alice and Bob trace (if needed) some of states σi, leaving tmin(m) = bmd −δ(m)c
of states σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1. For simplicity we will denote tmin(m) as t(m). Without loss of generality we may assume
that Eve knows the very type of string i of system AB which we denote as |t〉〈t|E˜ . Indeed, she may actually conclude
t from the kind and number of states traced out in item 5. Altogether the input state in item 6 of the protocol is of
the form :
ρin =
∑
t∈G
p(t)ρt ⊗ (|ψ0〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |ψd−1〉)⊗t(m)A′B′E ⊗ |t〉〈t|E˜ + pB |e〉〈e|AA′ ⊗ |e〉〈e|BB′ ⊗ |e〉〈e|EE˜ , (B7)
where |ψk〉 ≡ |ψk〉〈ψk|.
On the system A′B′ Alice and Bob have then A′B′ subsystem of the state (|ψ0〉 ⊗ |ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψd−1〉)⊗t(m). Now
from the very definition of distillable key, for any good t (that is t ∈ G), from this they distill by some operation
Λt(m) a state
||γˆdt(m) − γdt(m) ||1 ≤ ′t(m) (B8)
on systems A′B′A′′B′ such that
log dt(m)
t(m)
≥ KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1)− δ′(m) (B9)
γA′B′A′′B′ is a private state. For bad t (that is t /∈ G), Λt(m) creates additional flags |e〉A′′ ⊗ |e〉B′′ . Without loss of
generality we may assume that it is accompanied by creation of state |eE′′〉. To analyse the key rate of the considered
protocol it will be convenient to use the notion of classical distillable key [29] CD (for the definition, see Appendix).
It is shown that if there exists protocol which distills from ρ a state close to private state by  via LOCC operation,
then there also exists a protocol with local operations and public communication, which works on purification of the
input state ρ and distills state that is close to an ideal ccq state by 2
√
 (see theorem 4.11 of [27]), with the same rate
of key (KD(ρ) = CD(ψρ)). In our case KD
(
(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1)⊗t(m)
)
= CD
(
(|ψ0〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψd−1〉)⊗t(m)
)
. Hence, there
exists LOPC operation Λ˜t(m) which distills state αˆA′B′E′(dt(m)) of the ccq form
∑dt(m)
i,j=0 |ij〉〈ij|A′B′ ⊗ρ(ij)E′ , such that:
||αˆA′B′E′(dt(m))− αideal(dt(m))||1 ≤ 2
√
′t(m), (B10)
where
αideal(dt(m)) =
1
dt(m)
dt(m)−1∑
k=0
|kk〉〈kk|A′B′ ⊗ ρE′ . (B11)
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As we will see, to lower bound the key rate of the considered protocol, it is enough to analize the state which would
be the output of Λ˜t(m):
ρm =
∑
t∈G
p(t)ρt ⊗ αˆA′B′E′ (d, t(m))⊗ |t〉〈t|E˜ + pB |e〉〈e|AA′ ⊗ |e〉〈e|BB′ ⊗ |e〉〈e|E′′ , (B12)
where |t〉〈t| is the state which describes Eve’s knowledge about type t of her total state on E′′ = E′E˜. Our figure of
merit will be state which is close by in the trace norm distance, and simpler to analyse. This is the above state with
αideal in place of αˆ(dt(m)):
ρ′m =
∑
t∈G
p(t)ρt ⊗ (αideal)A′B′E′ ⊗ |t〉〈t|E˜ + pB |e〉〈e|AA′ ⊗ |e〉〈e|BB′ ⊗ |e〉〈e|E′′ . (B13)
To see that the above state is close to ρm observe that for all t, t
′ ∈ G such that t′ 6= t there is ρt⊗|t〉〈t| ⊥ ρt′⊗|t′〉〈t′|.
We can also assume w.l.g. that symbol e of the error states |e〉AA′ ⊗ |e〉BB′ ⊗ |e〉E′′ does not belong to the set
Σ = {0, . . . , d− 1}×m. Thanks to these two facts, via properties of the trace norm and Eq. (B10) we obtain:
||ρm − ρ′m||1 < t(m), (B14)
where t(m) ≡ 2
√
′t(m).
We will now reduce the problem of calculating the rate of the considered protocol to study of the Devetak-Winter
formula of certain state as follows, which shows that it is enough to analyse the state (B12)
∀m,k mkKD(γd) ≥ KD(γ⊗mkd ) = CD(ψ⊗mkγd ) ≥ CD(ρ⊗kin ) ≥ CD(ρ⊗km ) ≥ RDW (ρ⊗km ), (B15)
In first inequality we use definition of KD which, as operational entanglement measure is regularized by definition.
We then use the aforementioned equivalence between CD and KD where CD is calculated on the purification of input
state |ψγd〉 to system of Eve. We then use the fact that CD is non-increasing under operations of Alice and Bob. By
RDW we denote the rate of the (one-way) Devetak-Winter protocol run for k copies of the state. In the last step we
follow [9], observing that it need not be optimal, yet is good enough for our purpose, hence the last inequality follows.
From [29] we have that:
RDW (ρ⊗km ) = k (I(AA′ : BB′)ρm − I(AA′ : E′′)ρm)− o(k) ≡ kCDW (ρm)− o(k), (B16)
hence, in the limit of large k there is:
KD(γd) ≥ 1
m
(I(AA′ : BB′)ρm − I(AA′ : E′′)ρm) ≡
1
m
CDW (ρm), (B17)
for all m. It is then enough to find lower bound on the RHS of the above inequality. We will find it using asymptotic
continuity of entropy (and conditional entropy), based on the fact that ρm is close to ρ
′
m for which it is rather easy
to calculate the entropies. Lemma 1 states that
CDW (ρm) ≥ m log d+ (1− pB)t(m)(KD(σ)− δ(m))− (m+ d− 1)h
(
m
m+ d− 1
)
− f(t(m), d, dt(m),m) (B18)
with limm→∞,n→0
1
mf(t(m), d, dt(m),m) = 0. Thus in limit of large m = sd (s → ∞) we obtain the desired lower
bound. To see this observe that we can set δ(m) = 2 logm
√
d√
m
which assures pB → 0. Further, t(m)m ≥ 1d − δ(m), thus
we have:
t(m) (KD(σ˜)− δ′(m)) ≥ 1
d
KD(σ˜)− δ(m)KD(σ˜)− δ′(m). (B19)
Finally KD(σ˜) ≤ d log d′ where d′ is the dimension of the shield part of γd, hence the pre-last term in the above tends
to 0 with m for our choice of δ(m). Now, since h(1) = 0, the term h( mm+d−1 ) vanishes asymptotically as well. Finally
δ′(m) was arbitrarily small, hence the thesis. uunionsq
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Lemma 1. For the state ρm from Eq. (B12), there is:
CDW (ρm) ≥m log d+ (1− pB)t(m) (KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1)− δ(m))
− (m+ d− 1)h
(
m
m+ d− 1
)
− f(t(m), d, dt(m),m)
(B20)
with limm→∞,n→0
1
mf(t(m), d, dt(m),m) = 0.
Inserting the state ρm into Eq. (B16) gives
CDW (ρm) = I(AA
′ : BB′)ρm − I(AA′ : E′′)ρm . (B21)
However, we will compute the above quantity for ρ′m and will use the asymptotic continuity of CDW .
We will first lower bound I(AA′ : BB′). From the definition of quantum mutual entropy, it is equal to
I(AA′ : BB′) = S(AA′)− S(AA′|BB′), (B22)
where S(AA′|BB′) is the quantum conditional entropy. We will also use the Fannes inequality for the asymptotic
continuity of the von Neumann entropy [45], i.e. for ||ρ1 − ρ2||1 ≤  we have
|S(ρ1)− S(ρ2)| ≤ ||ρ1 − ρ2||1 log d+ η(||ρ1 − ρ2||1), (B23)
where η(x) = −x log x, and the Alicki-Fannes inequality for continuity of the conditional entropy [46]:
|SX|Y (ρ1)− SX|Y (ρ2)| ≤ 4||ρ1 − ρ2||1 log dX + h (||ρ1 − ρ2||1) , (B24)
where here X,Y denotes two subsystems of ρ1 and ρ2.
Direct calculations of entropies for the state ρ′m give for each part
S(AA′) = (1− pB) log dt(m) + S
(∑
T
p(T )ρ˜T
)
, (B25)
where for T = {t : t ∈ G ∨ t = tB}, p(T ) = p(t) for t ∈ G and p(T = tB) = pB . Then, for T ∈ G, ρT = ρt =
TrB
∑
i∈Qt
1
|Qt| |ii〉〈ii|AB and for T = tB , ρ˜T = |e〉〈e|A.
We know that
log dt(m) ≥ t(m) (KD(σ)− δ(m)) . (B26)
The entropy of BB′ is the same as S(AA′). It remains to calculate the joint entropy S(AA′BB′), which is equal to
S(AA′), since the systems AA′ and BB′ are maximally correlated. We are going to lower bound I(AA′ : BB′)ρm as
follows:∣∣I(AA′ : BB′)ρm − I(AA′ : BB′)ρ′m∣∣ ≤ ∣∣S(AA′)ρm − S(AA′)ρ′m ∣∣+ ∣∣S(AA′|BB′)ρm − S(AA′|BB′)ρ′m ∣∣ . (B27)
Now in the RHS we apply the asymptotic continuity of the entropies obtaining :∣∣I(AA′ : BB′)ρm − I(AA′ : BB′)ρ′m∣∣ ≤ 5t(m) log (dm dt(m))+ 3h (t(m)) . (B28)
hence for g′1
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
)
= 5t(m) log
(
dm dt(m)
)
+ 3h
(
t(m)
)
we have:
I(AA′ : BB′)ρm ≥ (1− pB) log dt(m) + S
(∑
T
p(T )ρ˜T
)
− g1
(
t(m), d, d
′,m
)
. (B29)
Finally we observe that ∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
T
p(T )ρ˜T − 1
dm
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 2pB . (B30)
thus, again via the Fannes inequality:
I(AA′ : BB′)ρm ≥ (1− pB) log dt(m) +m log d− 2pBm log d− h(2pB)− g′1(t(m), d, dt(m),m) (B31)
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denote
g1
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
) ≡ 2pBm log d+ h(2pB) + g′1 (t(m), d, dt(m),m) . (B32)
We are left with calculating I(AA′ : E′′). It is equal to I(AA′ : E′′) = S(AA′)− S(AA′|E′′), where S(AA′|E′′) =
S(AA′E′′)− S(E′′) is the conditional entropy. The entropy S(AA′) is already bounded in (B25) Next, we have
S(E′′) = (1− pB)S(ρE′) +H ({p(T )}) , (B33)
where ρE′ = TrA′B′αideal and H(·) is the Shannon entropy. Finally,
S(AA′E′′) = H ({p(T )}) + (1− pB)
(
log dt(m) + S(ρE′)
)
+
∑
t∈G
p(t)S(ρt). (B34)
Summing up, we have
I(AA′ : E′′)ρ′m ≤ −H ({p(T )}) +H ({p(T )}) + S
(∑
T
p(T )ρ˜T
)
−
∑
t∈G
p(t)S(ρt)
= S
(∑
T
p(T )ρ˜T
)
−
∑
T
p(T )S(ρ˜T ) =: χ,
(B35)
By the asymptotic continuity of entropy and conditional entropy, we have:∣∣I(AA′ : E′′)ρm − I(AA′ : E′)ρ′m ∣∣ ≤ t(m) log dt(m) + η(t(m)) + 4t(m) log (dm dt(m))+ 2h (t(m)) , (B36)
but, since I(AA′ : E′)ρ′m ≤ χ,
I(AA′ : E′′)ρm ≤ χ+ t(m) log dt(m) + η(t(m)) + 4t(m) log(dm dt(m)) + 2h(t(m)). (B37)
Let us set
g2(t(m), d, d
′,m) ≡ t(m) log dt(m) + η(t(m)) + 4t(m) log(dm dt(m)) + 2h(t(m)). (B38)
Knowing that the Holevo quantity is upper bounded by the entropy of the signal distribution we have [47]
χ = S
(∑
T
p(T )ρ˜T
)
−
∑
T
p(T )S(ρ˜T ) ≤ H({p(T )}) ≤ H({p(t)}). (B39)
Now entropy of the ”distribution of types” is less than the log of the support of this distribution which is the number
of types. Hence by (B6) we have:
S
(∑
T
p(T )ρ˜T
)
−
∑
T
p(T )S(ρ˜T ) ≤ (m+ d− 1)h
(
m
m+ d− 1
)
. (B40)
and thus I(AA′ : E′′) ≤ (m+ d− 1)h
(
m
m+d−1
)
+ g2
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
)
.
Summing up bounds (B31) and (B37) we obtain:
CDW (ρm) ≥ (1− pB) log dt(m) +m log d− g1
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
)
− (m+ d− 1)h
(
m
m+ d− 1
)
− g2
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
)
.
(B41)
Due to (B26) there is:
CDW (ρm) ≥ (1− pB)t(m) (KD(σ˜)− δ(m)) +m log d− g1
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
)
− (m+ d− 1)h
(
m
m+ d− 1
)
− g2
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
)
.
(B42)
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Define now f = g1 + g2 and observe, that for m = sd with s → ∞ such defined f
(
t(m), d, dt(m),m
)
divided by m
approaches 0 with t(m) approaching 0. Indeed apart from bounded terms in f such as h
(
t(m)
)
which are clearly
sublinear in m, we have terms O
(
t(m) log
(
dmdt(m)
))
. Such term breaks into two t(m)m log d and t(m) log dt(m).
The first term is sublinear in m if only t(m) → 0. This is assured by m = sd so that t(m) ≈ md → ∞. The second
term is equal to
t(m) log
(
(d′)d
)t(m)
= t(m)t(m)d log d
′ ≤ t(m)
(m
d
+ δ(m)
)
d log d′ = t(m)m log d′ + t(m)δ(m)d log d′. (B43)
The first term of the RHS of last equality is sublinear in m as we argued above, while the second vanishes for our
choice of δ(m) = 2 logm
√
d√
m
. Hence the assertion follows. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 2. The first part of the proof is based on Theorems 3 and 4 from [7]. For the sake of completeness
we present here the crucial steps which are necessary to prove our result. From Theorem 3 of the above-mentioned
paper for the state γ⊗nABA′B′ we have Er
(
γ⊗nABA′B′
) ≤ log dn+ 1dn ∑dn−1k=0 Er(ρk), where k = (i1, . . . , in) is a multi-index
with il ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1} for every l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and ρk = σi1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σin . This equation divided by n from the
both sides can be easily rewritten as 1nEr
(
γ⊗nABA′B′
) ≤ log d+ 1ndn ∑dn−1k=0 Er(ρk), where the left-hand-side for n→∞
approaches E∞r
(
γ⊗nABA′B′
)
. First of all, let us recall that Er(ρk) = Er(ρk′) which has the same numbers of occurrence
of symbols from the set {0, . . . , d− 1}, i.e. when k = k′. Additionally, considering only those ρk for which k is
δ−strongly typical (δ > 0) we have
∀a ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}
∣∣∣∣a(k)n − 1d
∣∣∣∣ < δ, (B44)
where a(k) denotes frequency of a symbol a in a sequence k. The set of such k we denote as ST nδ . Rewriting
∑
k Er(ρk)
over k ∈ ST nδ and k /∈ ST nδ due to[7] we have
1
ndn
dn−1∑
k=1
Er(ρk) ≤ 1
ndn
∑
k∈ST nδ
Er(ρk) +  log d, (B45)
where  > 0. Now, our goal is to improve the bound on Er(ρk) = Er
(
σ⊗m00 ⊗ σ⊗m11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ⊗md−1d−1
)
when n → ∞,
where σi are conditional states on A
′B′. Defining m ≡ min {m0,m1, . . . ,md−1} we can make the following observation
using the fact on strong typicality (B44)
∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d− 1}
∣∣∣∣min − 1d
∣∣∣∣ < δ ∧ ∣∣∣∣mn − 1d
∣∣∣∣ < δ. (B46)
By the triangle inequality we have ∣∣∣m
n
− mi
n
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣mn − 1d
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣1d − min
∣∣∣∣ < 2δ. (B47)
Using the definition of the parameter m and triangle inequality we are able to rewrite the first term on the RHS of
(B45) as
1
ndn
∑
k∈ST nδ
Er
(
σ⊗m00 ⊗ σ⊗m11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ⊗md−1d−1
)
≤
∑
k∈ST nδ
m
ndn
1
m
Er
(
σ˜⊗m
)
+
∑
k∈ST nδ
m˜0
ndn
1
m˜0
Er
(
σ⊗m˜00
)
+ · · ·+
∑
k∈ST nδ
m˜d−1
ndn
1
m˜d−1
Er
(
σ
⊗m˜d−1
d−1
)
,
(B48)
where σ˜ = σ0 ⊗ σ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 and ∀i m˜i ≡ mi −m. The first term on the RHS of (B48) by the condition given by
(B44) and the definition of the regularized relative entropy we get
(
1
d + δ
)
(1− δ)E∞r (σ˜), which approaches 1dE∞r (σ˜),
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since δ can be arbitrarily small. Now, we have to bound the rest of terms (the tail) in (B48). To do so, we use the
definition of the relative entropy of entanglement Er and the fact that 1/d ∈ SEP:
∀σ˜ Er(σ˜) ≡ inf
ω∈SEP
D(σ˜|ω) ≤ D
(
σ˜|1
d
)
, (B49)
where D(·|·) denotes the relative entropy. Thanks to this D(σ˜|1d ) = −Trσ˜ log σ˜−Trσ˜ log(1/d) = log d−S(σ˜) ≤ log d,
since ∀σ˜ S(σ˜) ≥ 0, where S(·) is the von Neumann entropy. Because of that, and the subadditivity of Er we can bound
every term from the tail in (B48) as (1/m˜i)Er(σ˜
⊗m˜i) ≤ Er(σ˜) ≤ log di. Finally, we are in the position to bound the
tail in (B48), namely by (B47) and by above considerations the desired bound is of the form 2δ(1− δ)∑i log di. Now
since the sum
∑
i log di is constant and δ can be arbitrarily small we conclude that the tail in (B48) vanishes. uunionsq
Appendix C: Proofs from Section III
Proof of Observation 1. For the proof it amounts to observe that KD is superadditive, Er is subadditive and Isq is
additive [48], while the latter two are bounds on KD [1, 5, 7, 48] . uunionsq
Proof of Proposition 1. We have by the definition Rir ⊆ IR. We show that IR ⊆ Rir unless a bound key state
exists. The proof goes by contradiction. Suppose there exists γ0 ∈ IR\Rir. We will show that it implies existence of
bound key states. Let it have the form γ0 =
1
d
∑d−1
i,j=0 |ii〉〈jj| ⊗ UiσU†j and σj ≡ UjσU†j . For the state γ by Theorem
1 we have
KD(γ0) ≥ log d+ 1
d
KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1), (C1)
since the protocol from Theorem 1 may be suboptimal.
Since γ0 is from IR, we have KD(γ0) = log d which proves KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) = 0. By monotonicity of KD this
proves, that for all i we have KD(σi) = 0, as σi can be obtained from σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 by LOCC.
On the other hand, γ0 does not belong to Rir, that is KD(γ0) 6= Er(γ0). More precisely log d < Er(γ0), since
KD ≤ Er in general. Due to subadditivity of Er via Theorem 2, there is
log d < Er(γ0) ≤ log d+ 1
d
Er(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) (C2)
and since Er(γ0) > log d, we have by the above the inequality that
Er(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) > 0. (C3)
From the faithfulness of the relative entropy of entanglement [49] it follows that at least one σi has to be entangled.
Otherwise, if all σi were separable, it would mean, that the product σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1 is also separable and hence
Er(σ0⊗· · ·⊗σd−1) = 0. Recall however, that as we argued above, KD(σi0) = 0 therefore σi has the bound key. Thus
if there are no bound key states, we have IR ⊆ Rir which proves IR = Rir under no key bound states condition as
claimed. uunionsq
One can see that proof of Proposition 1 can be obtained using bound (18) of Theorem 2 for regularized relative
entropy by substituting it into (C2) and using argument of faithfulness.
Proof of Corollary 2. From paper [50] we know that any state in 2 ⊗ 2 which is entangled, has non-zero distillable
entanglement. Since we work with irreducible private states as a direct consequence of Proposition 1 if follows that
KD(σi) = 0 and therefore each state σi is separable as there are no bound key states in 2 ⊗ 2. The second part
follows from the application of Lemma 3 of [7], as
√
XX† and
√
X†X are separable, hence have the positive partial
transposition and this lemma applies. uunionsq
Appendix D: Proofs from Section IV
Proof of Observation 2. KD(γ) = log d implies via Theorem 1, that KD(σ0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ σd−1) ≡ KD(σ˜) = 0. However the
state γˆ can be obtained from σ˜ via an LOCC operation. Indeed, attaching a state ρa =
1
d
∑
i |ii〉〈ii| is LOCC as the
latter state is separable. Then making the control-partial trace over all but the i − th state σi from σ˜ is an another
bi-local LOCC operation. The partial trace over the ancillary state leaves us with γˆ. Since the LOCC operation on
the key-udistillalbe state leaves it key-undistillable, for n = 1 the assertion follows. The proof for n > 1 is analogous:
just with ρ⊗na in the place of ρa. uunionsq
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Proof of Theorem 5. Let us set U1 ⊗ U2 arbitrarily. We have a chain of (in)equalities, which we explain below.
0 ≥ CDW ((U1 ⊗ U2ρU†1 ⊗ U†2 )ccq)
= CDW ((UU1 ⊗ U2ρU†1 ⊗ U†2U†)ccq)
≡ CDW ((ρ′)ccq) ≥ CDW
(
(TrA′B′ρ
′)ccq
)
.
(D1)
The first inequality comes from the fact that composition of U1 ⊗ U2 and the Devetak-Winter protocol applied to
subsystem of the state U1 ⊗ U†2ρU1 ⊗ U†2 is a particular key-distillation protocol, which on a key-undistillable state
cannot achieve a positive rate (in fact CDW as one can see in Eq. (A13) can be negative). The ccq state considered
there is with respect to subsystem AB and computational basis, so as in the next equality. This equality is due to
the aforementioned fact that unitary transformation U† does not change the ccq state (w.r.t. to subsystem AB and
control-basis of U) of the state U1⊗U†2ρU1⊗U†2 (see Theorem 3.3 [27]). Now the partial trace of the subsystem A′B′
cannot increase the key, so that the final inequality holds, and the assertion follows. uunionsq
Proof of Corollary 3. The statement of corollary follows from the fact that the set of key-undistillable states is closed
under LOCC operations. We also use the fact that η(x) ≤ h(x) with h being the binary Shannon entropy function
and that binary Shannon entropy is less than 1. Idea of the embedding is based on least common multiple for
dimensions. Suppose that Λ(ρ) = ρd1 with dim ρd1 = d1. Then we define ρ
′ ≡ ρd1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗2d and γ′ ≡ γd ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗2d1
with dim |0〉〈0|d = d, dim |0〉〈0|d1 = d1. Because of that we have dim ρ′ = dim γ′ and the trace norm ||ρ′−γ′||1 can be
calculated. Moreover such embedding belongs to the set of LOCC operations, since we add only additionally ancilla
systems. uunionsq
Now we are in the position to prove theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. We will use the fact, that CDW is asymptotic continuous. Clearly for the singlet state it reads
log d and for the state emerging from the key-undistillable state via control-unitary and the partial trace, must be
zero through Theorem 5. This in turn implies the bound on the distance between states. Let us note here, that
it is actually rather uncommon usage of the asymptotic continuity, aiming at the proof that states must be far as
continuous faction differs on them enough, rather than finding evaluation of functions close on some close states.
We first invoke the asymptotic continuity of the entropy and the conditional entropy function [51, 52]. As long as
the states satisfy ||ρ1 − ρ2||1 ≤ 12 (each on the dimension d), we have:
|S(ρ1)− S(ρ2)| ≤ ||ρ1 − ρ2||1 log d+ η (||ρ1 − ρ2||1) . (D2)
Let us fix 0 < ′ < 1, and note, that γ by the definition is of the form U |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| ⊗ σA′B′U† for U =
∑
ij |ij〉〈ij| ⊗
U
(ij)
A′B′ , some state σ on A
′B′ and |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| =
∑
ij
1
d |ii〉〈jj| the singlet state. Let us note here, that we assumed
that the control basis of twisting U is the computational basis, since the proof for other product basis {|ei〉 ⊗ |fi〉} is
analogous.
We first note that due to the monotonicity of operation under measurements, for an arbitrary state ρ and the
private state γ there is:
′ = ||γ − ρ||1 ≥
∣∣∣∣ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| − TrA′B′U†ρU ∣∣∣∣1 , (D3)
where ρ′ := TrA′B′U†ρU the result of ”untwisting” U† and the partial trace on ρ.
As announced, we use now the fact that CDW ((|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|)ccq) = log d and CDW ((ρ′)ccq) ≤ 0 due to Theorem 5,
as KD(ρ) = 0. Hence, unless 
′ > 1, throughout asymptotic continuity of entropic functions, we have the following
chain of inequalities:
log d ≤ |CDW ((|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|)ccq)− CDW ((ρ′)ccq)|
≤ |log d− S(ρ˜A)|+ |log d− S(ρ˜B)|
+ |log d− S(ρ˜AB)|+ I(A : E)ρ˜,
(D4)
where ρ˜ = (ρ′)ccq and we consider particular subsystems of ρ˜. Following [27] we now observe, that I(A : E)ρ′ccq ≤
S(A : B)ρ′ . Since ρ
′ is close to the singlet state which is pure it satisfies:
S(A : B)ρ′ ≤|| |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| − ρ′||1 log d2
+ η (|| |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| − ρ′||1) .
(D5)
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It is crucial to observe now, that the state ρ′ after measurement in basis of untwisting is equal to the AB subsystem
of the state ρ˜, by definition of the action of taking a ccq state. We have then:
1 = ||ρ˜A − 1/d||1 ≤ 
2 = ||ρ˜B − 1/d||1 ≤ 
3 =
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ρ˜AB − 1d∑
i
|ii〉〈ii|
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤ 
(D6)
and hence from (D4) and the above inequalities via (D2) there is
log d ≤1 log d+ η(1) + 2 log d+ η(2)+
3 log d
2 + η(3) +  log d
2 + η().
(D7)
Now we use the fact, that function η(x) is increasing for x ∈ [0 , 0.367879]. This assures that we can upper bound the
RHS of above by  in place of 1, 2, 3. We then obtain:
log d ≤ 2 (log d+ η()) + 2 ( log d2 + η())
= 6 log d+ 4η()
(D8)
which implies
 ≥ 1
6
− 2η()
3 log d
, (D9)
as claimed. uunionsq
Appendix E: Proofs from Section V
Proof of Observation 3. For the first part of theorem we base on results of section IV. Namely, from the proof of
Theorem 5 it follows that
KD(ρ) ≥ CDW ((TrA′B′(U†ρU))ccq) (E1)
where U is the unitary which defines γ˜. Now if ||ρ − γ˜|| = ′ ≤  by asymptotic continuity of CDW obtained in
inequalities (D4-D8), there is
CDW ((TrA′B′(U
†ρU)ccq) ≥ log d− 6′ log d− 4η(′), (E2)
which for ′ ≤  ≤ 12 implies the same inequality for  due to monotonicity of the function η on interval [0 , 0.367879]
This proves the first part of thesis of this theorem. For the second part, by the assumption there exists an irreducible
private state γ˜ close by  in the trace norm to ρ which has the property that M(ρ) = log d. We use the asymptotic
continuity of M to obtain that |M(ρ)−M(γ˜)| ≤ O ( log d+ h()). Hence KD(ρ) ≤M(ρ) ≤ log d+O ( log d+ h ()).
uunionsq
Appendix F: Multipartite private states
Definition 15. (compare [6]) Let Ui be some unitary operations for every i and let %A′B′1...B′l be a density matrix
acting on H′. By the multipartite private state or multipartite pdit of l + 1 subsystems we mean the following
γ
(d)
AB1...BlA′B′1...B
′
l
=
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|i(1) . . . i(l)〉〈j(1) . . . j(l)| ⊗ Ui%A′B′1...B′lU
†
j . (F1)
Naturally, for l = 1 the above reproduces the bipartite private states. Moreover, in that case, the multipartite
distillable key satisfies [6]
CD(%AB1...BlE) ≥ min
j∈{1,...,l}
I(A :Bj)(%
(cqq)
ABjE
)− I(A :E)(%(cqq)ABjE). (F2)
Here, %
(cqq)
ABjE
denotes the cqq state, which arises from the general one by tracing out all the parties but the first and
jth one and Eve.
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1. Proof of Theorem 1 for multipartite private states
In this section we will argue, that the same lower bound as given in Theorem 1 holds in the case of multipartite
private states.
We show this by studying the rate of the analogous protocol as described in Section II, with B → B1, . . . , Bl for
some finite number l of the parties, so that the total private state has l + 1 subsystems (lth+1 denoted as A for the
Alices’ subsystem). We note that the protocol is realizable, since multipartite private state has maximally correlated
subsystems in secure basis, so that each of the parties can perform control-sorting of the conditional states σi which
is the main step of the protocol.
We will show now the cases when the proof for bipartite case needs to be modified. The state in (B2) is the same
with the only change that
1. ρt =
∑
i
1
|Qt| |ii〉〈ii|AB1...Bl , where i is the multiindex with l values i each for one of several Bob’s system
2. the error state has more error flags: |e〉A ⊗ |e〉B1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |e〉Bl ⊗ |e〉E .
These two changes are the only modifications of the state ρin of Eq. (B7) to the multipartite case. Further, although
the state E′ is different than in bipartite case, due to larger number of communication, we never used actual form of
its state, hence it is still denoted as ρE′ . In particular in Eq. (B10) the only difference is that the state αideal is of
the form:
αideal =
1
dt(m)
dt(m)−1∑
k=0
|kk〉〈kk|AB1...Bl ⊗ ρE′ (F3)
with k = k . . . k for l systems. In this step we have used analogous fact to KD = CD in multipartite case give in [6].
Now the analogues of states ρm and ρ
′
m (denote them ρm(l) and ρm(l)
′
), differ from ρm and ρ
′
m respectively only by
the two aforementioned changes 1 and 2 as well as difference in definition of αideal and αˆideal. It is then clear that
||ρm(l)− ρm(l)′||1 ≤ t(m). (F4)
Further, we have by analogous considerations and the inequality F2 the lower bound:
KD(γd) ≥ 1
m
(
min
i∈{1,...,l}
I(AA′ : BiB′i)ρm(l) − I(AA′ : E′′)ρm(l)
)
≡ 1
m
R˜DW (ρm(l)). (F5)
Without loss of generality we may assume that the above minimization is realized for i = 1. It is now crucial to
observe, that
∀i∈{1,...,l} ρm|AA′BiB′iE′′(l)
′
= ρm|AA′B1B′1E′′(l)
′
(F6)
where ρm|AA′BiB′iE′′(l)
′
is the state ρm(l)
′
after tracing out all systems Bj 6= Bi. We then use the fact that due to
(F4), the state ρm|AA′B1B′1E′′(l) is close in trace norm to ρm|AA′B1B′1E′′(l)
′
, so that we can compute R˜DW (ρm(l)
′) and
use asymptotic continuity of the mutual information to conclude about R˜DW (ρm(l)). It is then crucial to observe
that ρm|AA′B1B′1E′′(l)
′ has the same form as ρ′m. Thus, we conclude that the main claim of the Lemma 1 stays the
same in multipartite case. What changes is the function f(m, dt(m), d,m), with a substitution d
′ → d′l, as there are
l parties. However we still have 1mf(m, dt(m), d,m) → 0 for the same δ(m) as in the bipartite case. It is just more
demanding for m and δ(m) to make l log d
′ zero, which is yet possible as long as l is constant. We have then proved,
that the proof for the multipartite case is mutatis mutandis equivalent to the bipartite one.
